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## SECURE DATA BROKER

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### **BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION**

#### **Field of the Invention**

The invention relates to information security, and more particularly, to systems and methods for improving the security of information transactions over networks.

#### **Description of the Related Art**

The internet has become an important medium for information services and electronic commerce. As the internet has been commercialized, organizations initially established their presence in cyberspace by making information (typically static, non-sensitive promotional information) available on resources well removed from the operational infrastructure of the organization. Security issues were often addressed by isolating publicly accessible resources (e.g., web servers) from more sensitive assets using firewall techniques. As long as the publicly accessible information and resources were relatively non-sensitive and user interactions with such information and resources was not mission critical, relatively simple firewall techniques were adequate. Though information and resources outside the firewall were at risk, the risk could generally be limited to non-proprietary information that was easily replaceable if compromised. Proprietary information and systems critical to day-to-day operations were sheltered behind the firewall and information flows across the firewall were filtered to exclude all but the comparatively non-threatening services such as electronic mail.

However, as the internet has become pervasive, and as the sophistication of tools and techniques has increased, several aspects of the security environment have changed dramatically. First, businesses have recognized the power of information transactions that more tightly couple to operational data systems, such as order processing, inventory, payment systems, etc. Such transactions include electronic commerce with direct purchasers or consumers (e.g., browsing, selecting and purchasing of books by members of the public from an on-line bookseller) as well as supply chain and/or business partner interactions (e.g., automated just-in-time inventory management, customer-specific pricing, availability and order status information, etc.). In short, commercially relevant transactions increasingly require information flows to and from secure operational systems. Second, even information-only services are increasingly mission-critical to their providers. Corporate image can be adversely affected by unavailability of, or degradation access to, otherwise non-sensitive information such as customer support information, product upgrades, or marketing and product information. Because many businesses rely heavily on such facilities, denial of service attacks represent an increasing threat.

In information security environments, authentication facilities are typically designed to establish to a desired degree of certainty that a particular transaction is performed on behalf of a particular principal. Similarly, authorization facilities are designed to enforce security policies limiting access on behalf of an authenticated principal to a particular subset of information resources. Unfortunately, despite well designed authentication and authorization facilities, information security policies and systems designed to implement such policies may be subverted by malformed requests or even well formed requests that attempt an end run around a security policy. For example, malformed requests may be employed to access secure systems by exploiting buffer overflow or similar types of security holes. In addition, malformed requests may be employed in denial of service type and other malicious attacks to crash or load down a server or information resource. Another threat involves the passing of directives (e.g., SQL statements, scripts, etc.) into an otherwise secure environment without validation and directly to an interpreter or other execution environment (e.g., an SQL engine, shell, etc.). Response messages may also be employed in ways that subvert a security policy,

although such threats usually imply compromised applications or directives passed into the secure environment.

Improved systems and techniques are needed to better manage information flows across security boundaries such as those provided by a firewall (or firewalls). Otherwise, the increasingly need for access to operational systems and data threatens to compromise the security of such system and data. Alternatively, security concerns will severely limit the viability of advanced electronic commerce techniques.

### **SUMMARY**

Accordingly, a secure data broker has been developed, which provides a restricted message based data exchange between a client application and a secured information resource by allowing registered or verified messages to be brokered across a security barrier. In some configurations, both requests and responses are validated and brokered across the security barrier. In other configuration, either requests or responses are validated. To support validation, messages are formatted in accordance with a predefined message specification for at least part of a transaction path between a client application and an information resource accessed by the client application. For example, in one configuration, incoming requests from a client application are received at a proxy that formats a corresponding request message and passes the formatted message to a parser for validation against the predefined message specification. Typically, predefined message specifications are encoded as a grammar or other functionally descriptive data representation suitable for directing a parser to validate a formatted message against a structured language definition. Message specifications are typically application and transaction specific, although in some implementations, groups of applications and/or transactions may share common message specifications. In one configuration, messages are formatted in accordance with an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) and message specifications are encoded as Data Type Definitions (DTDs).

For security reasons, predefined message specifications are preferably cryptographically secured (e.g., using digital signature techniques), although other

methods of securing message specifications may be suitable in a particular implementation. In some configurations, secure protocols such as HTTPS are employed. A wide-variety of security barriers are envisioned, although, in an exemplary configuration the security barrier employs firewall technology. Only validated request

5 messages are forwarded across the security barrier. Therefore, by suitably defining a legal set of requests (including in some configurations, both legal keyword tags and corresponding legal value ranges), security architectures in accordance with the present invention can limit security barrier crossing requests to valid requests. Similarly, in configurations that employ response validation, security barrier crossing responses can be

10 limited to valid responses.

In one embodiment in accordance with the present invention, a method of securing a data transaction across a security barrier includes validating a request message against a predefined request message specification, transmitting the validated request message across the security barrier, validating a response message against a predefined

15 response message specification, the response message corresponding to the validated request, and transmitting the validated response message across the security barrier.

In another embodiment in accordance with the present invention for a networked computing environment, a method of securing access to an information resource behind a security barrier includes predefining a request message specification corresponding to a

20 structured request language, formatting an access request in accordance with the structured request language, supplying the formatted access request to a first intermediary, the intermediary validating the formatted access request in accordance with the request message specification, and forwarding the validated access request across the security barrier. In some variations, response message validation is also provided. In

25 another variation, the method includes accessing the information resource in accordance with the validated access request.

In still another embodiment in accordance with the present invention for a networked computing environment, a method of securing access to an information resource behind a security barrier includes predefining a response message specification

corresponding to a structured response language, formatting a response to an access request targeting the information resource, the formatted response being in accordance with the structured response language, supplying the formatted response to an intermediary, the intermediary validating the formatted response in accordance with the response message specification; and forwarding a validated response across the security barrier. In some variations, request message validation is also provided. In another variation, the method includes accessing the information resource in accordance with the access request from a client and supplying the client with a response in accordance with the validated response.

10 In still yet another embodiment in accordance with the present invention, an information security system includes a security barrier, a proxy for an information resource and a data broker on the first side of the security barrier. The proxy and the information resource being on opposing first and second sides, respectively, of the security barrier. The data broker being on the first side of the security barrier, wherein, in response to an access request targeting the information resource, the data broker validates a request message against a predefined request message specification and forwards only validated request messages across the security barrier.

20 In still yet another embodiment in accordance with the present invention for networked information environment including a client and an information resource separated by a security barrier, an information security system includes means for proxying an access request by the client targeting the information resource and for preparing a request message corresponding to the access request in a structured language corresponding to a predefined request message specification and means for validating the request message against the predefined request message specification and forwarding only validated request messages across the security barrier.

## **BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS**

The present invention may be better understood, and its numerous objects, features, and advantages made apparent to those skilled in the art by referencing the accompanying drawings.

5           **FIG. 1** depicts an information security system employing a secure data broker configuration in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

**FIGS. 2, 3 and 4** depict information security system employing a secure data broker configuration in accordance with exemplary alternative embodiments of the present invention.

10          The use of the same reference symbols in different drawings indicates similar or identical items.

## **DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT(S)**

**FIG. 1** depicts an exemplary embodiment of an information security system employing a secure data broker configuration in accordance with the present invention.

15          In the embodiment of **FIG. 1**, three portions (a public network **101** portion, a private network **103** portion and a demilitarized zone **102** portion) of an internetworking environment are illustrated. Nonetheless, other network configurations and other communications networking environments may be employed. Clients, services, protocols and interfaces suitable for a particular networking environment or configuration will be  
20          appreciated by persons of ordinary skill in the art based on the description herein.

In general, a wide variety of entities, including human users operating browser and/or non-browser client applications as well as automated agents and systems, may interact with secure data broker facilities described herein. Furthermore, a variety of information resource identification schemes, such as by Uniform Resource Locator  
25          (URL), resource address, identifier or namespace designation, may be employed. However, for purposes of illustration and not limitation, an exemplary interaction involving a browser and information resources identified by URL is described in greater

detail. Nonetheless, based on the description herein, persons of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate the applicability of secured data broker techniques described herein to other clients, services, applications and protocols.

Focusing then on an exemplary web (WWW) browser-type client entity, web browser **105** is operated by a user (not shown) to transmit **(1)** an access request targeting an information resource such as secure data **180**. Typically, a targeted information resource is identified by a corresponding URL that resolves to a front-end application server **110**. Front-end application server **110** includes a conventional web server and a web-based application **112** (e.g., a front-end portion of an order processing application) together with facilities to proxy the access request via a secure data broker interface. In the configuration illustrated, both a corresponding back-end application server **150** and secure data **180** reside behind a security barrier **140** such that access is restricted to paths defined by the secure data broker configuration now described. In some configurations, an additional security barrier separates web browser **105** from demilitarized zone **102** (including front-end application server **110** and secure data broker server **120**).

In an exemplary realization, secure data broker proxy (SDBProxy) **111** embodies an Applications Programming Interface (API) that can be used to access the components of an SDB configuration. SDBProxy **111** defines method(s) that allow application **112** (e.g., an order processing front-end application) to send **(4)** a data access request to SDB server **120** and to receive a corresponding response **(17)**. In the configuration of **FIG. 1**, application **112** receives the incoming access request (e.g., as form data via an HTTP POST) and prepares a corresponding request message formatted in a structured request language. The particular syntax and semantics of the structured request language are application-, and in some cases transaction-, specific. However, in an exemplary realization, the request message takes the form of an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) string (or strings) encoding hierarchical tag-value pairs to transfer data in a structured and validatable way. Application **112** transforms an incoming access request by understanding the structure of the request and impressing some of that structure on the request message. For example, in an order processing application, one transaction or part

thereof may involve a user providing shipping information (e.g., recipient name, address, and delivery method such as by U.S. Mail or premium overnight delivery service).

Typically, such information will be posted to application 112 by an HTTP POST of form data including the recipient name, address, and delivery method from web browser 105.

5 Application 112 then formats a request message (e.g., as a string encoded XML message) that encodes the posted data in accordance with a predefined, order processing application- and transaction-specific format for transmission (via SDBProxy 111) to SDB server 120. XML tags are embedded within a HyperText Markup Language (HTML) message. In the configuration of FIG. 1, transmission (4) is via a secure HTTP  
10 connection

SDB server 120 receives the request message using a conventional HTTP service implemented thereon and directs (5) the request message to an SDB servlet 122 for validation. In the configuration of FIG. 1, SDB servlet 122 invokes (6) an XML parser 123 to validate the request message against a request message specification that has been  
15 encoded as a Data Type Definition (DTD) corresponding to the particular application and/or transaction. DTDs are one standard encoding for request message specifications; however, other encodings are also suitable. More generally, any encoding of a grammar defining the syntax of a structured request language is suitable for use with a corresponding parser. Parser implementations are well known in the art. For example,  
20 lex and yacc are commonly employed to generate parser implementations and a variety of commercial products are available. In general, suitable parsers for XML or other structured request languages are readily available and, based on the description herein, persons of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate a variety of suitable alternative implementations. In one presently preferred realization, the structured request language  
25 is XML, the request message specifications are encoded as DTDs and request message validation is performed using an XML parser (e.g., XML parser 123) implemented as a Java™ component. Java and all Java-based marks and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries.



In the exemplary configuration of **FIG. 1**, XML parser **123** selects an appropriate DTD from amongst multiple DTDs using a RequestId passed by application **112**. For example, a RequestId identifying a request message as associated with shipping information entry may select a particular corresponding DTD for use in validating the request message. In other configurations, a single grammar encoding may define legal messages corresponding to a variety of transactions. In either case, the request message is validated (7) against a request message specification specific to the application and/or transaction. For example, in an illustrative shipping information transaction, the request message may be parsed using a request message specification that requires that encoded shipping information take the form of a NAME tag followed by a string, an ADDRESS tag followed by at least two, but no more than three strings, and a SHIPPER tag followed by an integer (e.g., encoding a shipper selection). Other encodings would fail validation and a failure response would typically be generated. Note that a request message that is not validated is not transmitted across security barrier **140**. In some configurations, both structure of the request message and values encoded therein may be validated. For example, maximum string lengths may be encoded in a request message specification. In this way, many buffer overflow style attacks may be blunted. In addition, values may be qualified against ranges (e.g., shipper numbers between 1 and 5), content constraints or for consistency with an expected data type (e.g., a string encoding in accordance with a known character set). Referring illustratively to the configuration of **FIG. 1** and to an XML request message format, if an XML encoded request message is successfully parsed using a corresponding DTD, SDB servlet **122** forwards (8) the XML request via a secure HTTP connection to another SDB web server (e.g., SDB server **160**) across security barrier **140**. Otherwise, a failure response message is created and returned (17) to SDBProxy **111**.

SDB server **160** receives a validated request message (8) from across security barrier **140** and using a conventional HTTP service implemented thereon and directs (9) the request message to an SDB servlet **162** for relay (10) to back-end application server **150** via a secure HTTP connection. Back-end application server **150**, in turn, delivers (11) the validated request message, which in an exemplary embodiment is XML encoded,

to web-based application **152** (e.g., a back-end portion of an order processing application) hosted thereon. Application **152** processes the validated request message by retrieving or updating **(12)** the associated secure data **180**. For example, in the case of access request posting shipping information, application **152** may create or update a customer record in

5 a database to include the encoded shipping information. Access by application **152** to secure data **180** may be via any of a number of suitable techniques. For example, secure data **180** may be represented in a relational database and application **152** may interact with an associated DataBase Management System (DBMS) using Structured Query Language (SQL). Note that, in such a SQL-based configuration, the security of secure

10 data **180** is enhanced by forcing the transaction to pass validation at SDB server **120** and more particularly by not allowing a string encoding of a SQL statement to pass directly through security barrier **140** to an SQL engine. In general, the storage format for secure data **180** and mechanism used by the application to access secure data **180** (e.g. SQL, JDBC, RPC, etc.) is application specific and need not affect a particular secure data

15 broker configuration.

Note that in the illustrative configuration of **FIG. 1**, neither web browser **105** nor secure data **180** need generate or understand the selected structured request language (e.g., XML). As a result, secure data broker facilities can be interposed between existing commercial embodiments of browsers and information resources without modification of

20 the browser or information resource. In other configurations, either or both of web browser **105** and secure data **180** may integrate XML support. In the case of web browser **105**, XML support may take the form of a plug-in or other support specific to a suite of eCommerce applications.

Once the validated request message has been serviced by retrieval from or update

25 to secure data **180**, a response is supplied. For example, in response to a successful entry of shipping information, application **152** may generate an order confirmation number for supply to web browser **105**. In the configuration of **FIG. 1**, response messages are likewise encoded in accordance with a structured response language and validated against a response message specification (e.g., a response DTD). SDB server **160** receives **(13)**

the response message via the existing secure HTTP connection and directs (9) the response message to an SDB servlet 162 for validation. As before, the SDB servlet (e.g., SDB servlet 162) invokes (14) an XML parser 163 to validate the response message against a response message specification that has been encoded as a Data Type Definition (DTD) corresponding to the particular application and/or transaction.

In the exemplary configuration of FIG. 1, XML parser 163 selects an appropriate DTD from amongst multiple DTDs using a ResponseId passed by application 152. For example, a ResponseId identifying a response message as associated with shipping confirmation may select a particular corresponding DTD for use in validating the response message. As before, other encodings (e.g., as a grammar) may define legal messages. In either case, the response message is validated (15) against a response message specification specific to the application and/or transaction. For example, in the illustrative shipping information transaction, the response message may be parsed using a CONFIRMATION\_NUMBER tag followed by a string of predetermined length. Note that a response message that is not validated is not transmitted across security barrier 140. Instead, an error response is typically transmitted (16) over the existing secure HTTP connection.

If instead, the response message validated, a validated response message is transmitted (16) across security barrier 140 via the existing secure HTTP connection to SDB server 120. In turn, SDB server 120 relays (17) the validated response message on to SDBProxy 111 at front-end application server 110 via the existing secure HTTP connection. In the illustrative embodiment of FIG. 1, SDBProxy 111, in turn, extracts response data from the XML formatted validated response message and supplies the response data to application 112 (e.g., a front-end portion of an order processing application). For example, an encoded order confirmation number may be supplied to application 112. Finally, front-end application server 110 supplies (18) a response (including e.g., the order confirmation number) to web browser 105 for presentation to the user thereof. Note that SDBProxy 111 maintains an open HTTPS connection with

SDB server 120 for the duration of each XML request message (4) to validated response message (17) transaction. Multiple instances of SDBProxy 111 (and similarly of other components in a particular secure data broker configuration) may be employed to handle multiple concurrent requests. Each SDBProxy instance is preferably single threaded to

5 facilitate correlation of requests and responses, although other techniques such as secure transaction identifiers (e.g., tokens) may also be employed.

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~~In the configuration of FIG. 1, security barrier 140 is illustrative of a wide variety of structures and/or methods by which back-end application server 150 is or can be protected from direct access from public network 101 or demilitarized zone 102. One~~

10 realization of security barrier 140 includes a firewall or other selective filter. Although packet filter, firewall, or bastion server based security barriers are presently preferred. Other facilities are also suitable, for example server-based facilities that ensure SDB server 160 only accepts connection requests from SDB server 120 and by which back-end application server 150 and other similarly situated back-end applications servers) only

15 accept connection requests from SDB server 160 may be employed as, or as part of, security barrier 140. One bastion server implementation interposes a server hosting facilities illustrated separately as SDB server 120 and SDB server 160 on a single server

~~platform that~~

The integrity of a secure data broker configuration generally requires that request

20 and response message specifications (e.g., request DTDs 130 and response DTDs 170) be secured; however, any of a variety of mechanisms is suitable. For example, use of security barriers 140 and 141 tends to enhance message specification security. In some configurations, request and response message specifications are cryptographically secured to prevent unauthorized modification. Conventional digital signature or

25 encryption based techniques may be employed. Alternatively, request and/or response message specifications may be encoded in read only media to prevent unauthorized modification.

FIGS. 2 – 4 illustrate several variations on the secure data broker configuration described above. As before, the exemplary web (WWW) browser-type client entity and

internetworking components are merely illustrative. Clients, services, protocols and interfaces suitable for other networking environments or configurations will be appreciated by persons of ordinary skill in the art based on the description herein. **FIG. 2** illustrates a configuration in which only request messages are validated against  
 5 corresponding request message specifications. Such a request validation only configuration tends to improve performance. In general, malformed or malicious requests are a greater threat than malformed or malicious responses, particular in private network **103** configurations for which the integrity of applications can be reasonably assured. Accordingly, validation of response message **13A** is foregone and back-end  
 10 application server **150** need not XML encode the response message. Nonetheless, some configurations in accordance with the present invention may include XML encoding of response messages along at least a portion of the return path (**13A**, **17**) to front-end application server **110**. In the configuration of **FIG. 2**, the role of SDB server **160A** is rather limited, serving as a relay point. In configurations wherein security barrier **140**  
 15 includes a firewall, use of a relay point may facilitate packet filter design.

**FIG. 3** illustrates a configuration in which SDB server **160** is eliminated, in which validated request messages (**10B**) are supplied directly from SDB server **120B** to back-end application server **150** and in which response messages are returned (**13B**) directly from back-end application server **150** to SDB server **120B**. Response messages are, in  
 20 turn, relayed (**17**) back to SDBProxy **111**. A variety of configurations in accordance with **FIG. 3**, including bastion server implementations, will be appreciated by persons of ordinary skill in the art based on the description herein. For example, in one such configuration, SDB server **120B** is hosted on a server that provides the routing interface between demilitarized zone **102** and private network **103**. As before, back-end  
 25 application server **150** need not XML encode the response message, although some configurations in accordance with the present invention may include XML encoding of response messages along at least a portion of the return path (**13B**, **17**) to front-end application server **110**. Although not illustrated in **FIG. 1**, such an approach can also be employed in configurations in which both request message and response message  
 30 validation are performed. In such a configuration (not shown) facilities of SDB server

120 and SDB server 160 could be hosted on a bastion server acting as a security barrier interposed between front-end application server 110 and back-end application server 150.

**FIG. 4** illustrates yet another configuration in accordance with the present invention. Although, previous configurations have employed connection oriented use of protocols such as HTTP (or HTTPS), the configuration of **FIG. 4**, illustrates a secure data broker configuration in which response (13C) need not be returned via an existing connection. Instead, request message 4C, validated request message 10C and response message 13C are conveyed asynchronous protocols. For example, MQSeries protocols may be employed. Alternatively, HTTP may be employed in an unconventional manner. For example, request message 4C and validated request message 10C may each be conveyed by HTTPS connections that complete. Then, response message 13C may be conveyed by an independent transaction. Configurations employing other asynchronous protocol will be appreciated by persons of ordinary skill in the art based on the description herein. The configuration of **FIG. 4** presents some security challenges such as protection against spoofing and direction-specific ALLOW/DENY behavior of security barrier 140C. Nonetheless, techniques including the use of token based credentials (i.e., credentials that are passed with the message sequence) and asymmetric packet filter definition may be employed to overcome these challenges. As before, although not shown, functionality of SDB server 120C and security barrier 140C may be hosted on a bastion server interposed between demilitarized zone 102 and private network 103.

In some exemplary embodiments, at least some of the above-described components are implemented as servlets executable in the context of a commercially-available web server environment. For example, the Java™ Embedded Server (JES) architecture with extensions for certificate handling, HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), eXtensible Markup Language (XML) grammar processing and security Access Control List (ACL) support available from Sun Microsystems, Inc. is one suitable environment. Java and all Java-based marks and logos are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun

Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries. In some configurations, portions of a secure data broker implementation are implemented in a light weight framework, such as the Java embedded server, for creating distributed services. Java servlets can be plugged into the framework dynamically in a secure fashion. The  
5 framework then handles the communication between the servlets.

In general, the description herein is focused on aspects of a secure data broker facility, rather than on peculiarities of a particular implementation environment. It is envisioned that secure data broker facilities in accordance with the teachings of the present invention may be implemented in the context of many commercially-available  
10 networked information service environments, including web server environments, as well as in custom environments and environments that in the future will be developed. However, to facilitate an understanding of broad concepts using a specific exemplary environment, and without limitation, the description herein may include terminology specific to certain illustrative server architectures (e.g., Java Web Servers and Java  
15 Embedded Server architectures), protocols (e.g., HTTPS) and structured language frameworks (e.g., XML). Nonetheless, based on this description, persons of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate implementations suitable for other environments. The scope of the invention, as defined by the claims that follow, is not limited to any specific implementation environment.

20 While the invention has been described with reference to various embodiments, it will be understood that these embodiments are illustrative and that the scope of the invention is not limited to them. Many variations, modifications, additions, and improvements are possible. For example, boundaries between various components, services, servlets, registries and frameworks are somewhat arbitrary, and particular  
25 operations are illustrated in the context of specific illustrative configurations. Other allocations of functionality are envisioned and may fall within the scope of claims that follow. Structures and functionality presented as discrete components in the exemplary embodiment(s) may be implemented as a combined structure or component. These and

other variations, modifications, additions, and improvements may fall within the scope of the invention as defined in the claims that follow.